Selling two identical objects
نویسندگان
چکیده
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic are for two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. analyze settings: (i) decreasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing (IMV). Thus, the of buyer units not independent. show condition on distributions (due McAfee McMillan (1988)), (a) it sell first unit deterministically DMV model (b) bundle (which mechanism) IMV model. Under stronger sufficient distributions, mechanism Our results apply heterogeneous when there specified sequence must be sold.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1095-7235', '0022-0531']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105397