Separation network design with mass and energy separating agents

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Separation network design with mass and energy separating agents

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Computers & Chemical Engineering

سال: 2011

ISSN: 0098-1354

DOI: 10.1016/j.compchemeng.2010.10.013