Sequential Auctions with Generalized Interdependent Values
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals. JEL classi cation: D44 ; D82 ; C69 Keywords: Asymmetric Auctions; Interdependent Values; Perturbation Analysis, Revenue Equivalence. School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2747387