Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of auctions for common value or differentiated goods. New buyers and objects may arrive at random times. Since objects are imperfect substitutes, buyers’ private values are not persistent. Instead, buyers receive new signals or draw new values in each period. We consider the use of second-price auctions for selling these objects....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.010