Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
We study the e ects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We de ne the set of strong sequential communication equilibria (SSCE) and characterize it. SSCE di ers from the concept of sequential communication equilibrium (SCE) d...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.006