Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games [Halpern and Pass 2011a], where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider two notions of sequential equilibrium. One is an ex ante notion, where a player chooses his strategy before the game starts and is com...
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Definitions of sequential equilibrium and perfect equilibrium are given in games of imperfect recall. Subtleties regarding the definition are discussed. JEL Classification numbers: C70, D81.
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Definitions of sequential equilibrium and perfect equilibrium are given in games of imperfect recall.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2167-8375,2167-8383
DOI: 10.1145/3340232