Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revenue in contests with many participants
We show that in a contest with many participants and a single prize, the expected e¤ort (or resources) made by a participant whose evaluation of the prize is ranked as the kth highest valuation obeys an exponential rule in the limit and is equal to 1=2k of the total expected e¤ort made by all of the participants. Thus, even if the contests organizer can recover only k of the highest e¤ort, the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.010