Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice

This paper contributes to the theory of rational choice under sequential criteria. Following the approach initiated by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) for single-valued choice functions, we characterize choice correspondences that are rational by two sequential criteria under a mild consistency axiom. Rationales ensuring the sequential rationalization are explicitly constructed and a uniquely deter...

متن کامل

Rationalization of choice when preferences are vague

In this paper, we discuss the decision situation where the (vague) preferences are represented by fuzzy relations. There are two ways to interpret this situation: (i) an individual decision maker chooses perfect rankings from a set and uses that combination of rankings as her/his preference ranking. (ii) or a group of decision makers are reporting perfect rankings but their group decision is a ...

متن کامل

Choice by sequential procedures

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided by routes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We show that choice with a status-quo bias is a refinement of...

متن کامل

Sequential choice from several populations.

We consider the problem of sampling sequentially from two or more populations in such a way as to maximize the expected sum of outcomes in the long run.

متن کامل

Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice

In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for ordinal voting, standard voting methods of social choice may be impractical. How then can we design a mechanism preferably decentralized, simple, scalable, and not requiri...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences

سال: 2015

ISSN: 0165-4896

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.12.006