Serial Default and Debt Renegotiation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sovereign Debt Renegotiation and Credit Default Swaps
A credit default swap (CDS) contract provides insurance against default. After a country defaults, the country and its lenders usually negotiate over the share of the defaulted debt to be repaid. This paper incorporates CDS contracts into a sovereign default model and demonstrates that the existence of a CDS market results in lower default probability, higher debt levels, and lower nancing cost...
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We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash ows, rather than to divert them. In the rst part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract—specically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment—under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal. In the second part we consider a more general class of (nondebt) contracts, and derive suffic...
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Sovereign debt renegotiations take an average of nine years for bank loans but only one year for bonds. Our paper provides an explanation to this finding by highlighting one key difference between bank loans and bonds: bank debt is rarely traded, while bond debt is heavily traded on the secondary market. The secondary market plays a crucial information revelation role in shortening renegotiatio...
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A debt contract usually does not include a provision about renegotiation. The right to seize the borrower’s asset and the rules of this process are usually stipulated in the contract. Such a promise not to renegotiate is not credible since renegotiation can mitigate the dead-weight loss of liquidating insolvent borrowers. Once the initial contract may not consider the renegotiation procedure an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2416482