Shapley values for cluster importance

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract This paper proposes a novel approach to explain the predictions made by data-driven methods. Since such rely heavily on data used for training, explanations that convey information about how training affects are useful. The quantify different data-clusters of affect prediction. quantification is based Shapley values, concept which originates from coalitional game theory, developed fairly distribute payout among set cooperating players. A player’s value measure contribution. values often feature importance, ie. features extends this cluster letting clusters act as players in where payouts. methodology proposed lets us explore and investigate any black-box model, allowing new aspects reasoning inner workings prediction model be conveyed users. fundamentally existing explanation methods, providing insight would not available otherwise, should complement including importance.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1573-756X', '1384-5810']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10618-022-00896-3