Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Innovation
We examine whether and to what extent shareholder litigation shapes corporate innovation. We use the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws in 23 states from 1989 to 2005. These laws impose obstacles against shareholders filing derivative lawsuits thereby significantly reducing a firm’s litigation risk. Following the passage of the UD laws, firms have invested more in R&D, produce...
متن کامل“ Does Shareholder Litigation Deter Insider Trading ? ” on
This paper examines the possible deterrent effect of actual shareholder litigation on insider trading behavior for both defendant firms and their industry peers. We construct a composite index to capture the strength of a lawsuit as reflected in its merits and the rigorousness of the litigation process. Using a large litigation sample from 1996 to 2009, we find a significant decrease in the int...
متن کاملExecutive pay, earnings manipulation and shareholder litigation
The paper examines the role of executive compensation in inducing management behavior that triggers private securities litigation. Incentive pay in the form of options is found to increase the probability of securities class action lawsuits, holding constant a wide range of other firm characteristics. In contrast, base pay levels and share ownership do not have a significant impact on lawsuit i...
متن کاملShareholder Power and Corporate Governance
The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countries in that ownership is relatively dispersed. Typically the largest shareholder in any large listed company is likely to own a voting minority of the shares. Majority ownership by a single shareholder is unusual. It is not uncommon for the largest shareholding to be under 20 percent and in many c...
متن کاملWorkers vs. Shareholders under United States Corporate Law: Reforming Corporate Fiduciary Law to Protect Worker Interests
Despite both socio-economic and equitable reasons to consider workers'1 interests in boardroom decision-making, 2 corporate boards have usually ignored such interests, and corporate law in the United States generally has not imposed a fiduciary duty on these boards to take account of those interests. 3 Yet the social and economic consequences of corporate boards' lack of concern for workers' in...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.413980