Shareholder monitoring and discretionary disclosure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Accounting and Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0165-4101
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101422