Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sharing a polluted river
A river carries pollutants to people living along it if it is polluted. To make the water in the river clean, some costs are incurred. This poses a question of how to split the costs of cleaning the whole river among the agents located along it. To answer this question, we resort to the two main advocated doctrines in international disputes: the theory of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) ...
متن کاملSharing a polluted river network∗
A number of agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) are connected to a river network. Some agents are located upstream and some downstream. Upstream agents pollute the river network. To clean up the polluted river network, costs are incurred, and they are shared among the agents. In allocating these costs, the upstream-downstream relationship between agents has to be taken ...
متن کاملAn Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities
We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of d’Aspremont et al. (1983). These schemes are “almost ideal” in that they stabilize these coalitions which ...
متن کاملSequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy p...
متن کاملComment on ‘Sharing a polluted river’
In Ni and Wang (2007) two solutions are given to determine the division of the cost of cleaning a river among the agents located along the river. For each solution the authors give three different motivations, namely (i) an axiomatic characterization, (ii) the solution is the Shapley value of an appropriately defined cooperative TU-game, and (iii) the solution belongs to the Core of the associa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g10020023