Sharing risk through concession contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sharing risk through concession contracts
In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy...
متن کاملRisk Sharing in Poultry Contracts
In previous literature it was found that 84% of risk in poultry grow-out farms is transferred to the processing company, an integrator. A major reason for such a high risk transfer is the absence of a market price variable in determining compensation. We find that more recent contracts, which include a market price clause do not have such high risk transfer. Using welfare analysis we also concl...
متن کاملRange contracts: Risk sharing and beyond
We introduce and study the range contract, which allows a buyer to procure from a supplier at a prescribed price any amountwithin a specified range. In return, the supplier is compensated up front for thewidth of the rangewith a range fee. This fee canbe viewed as the buyer tradingmonetary value for reduceduncertainty. The range contract generalizes and unifiesmany common contracts, such as fix...
متن کاملRisk Sharing through Labor Contracts - Risk Aversion, Market Incompleteness and Employment
Labor contracts are a way of sharing idiosyncratic production risks between entrepreneurs and workers, especially when such risks are too complex for contingent contracts to be written on them. So it is important to understand how equilibrium employment and wages are affected by risk related factors, such as risk aversion of entrepreneurs and workers, risk sharing opportunities in the economy e...
متن کاملRegulatory trade-offs in the design of concession contracts
The paper discusses how conflicts between the multiple objectives of policymakers (efficiency, equity, fiscal, speed of reform, signaling,...) can influence the optimal design of concessions contract for network services in infrastructure. The discussion covers the relevance of information asymmetries for the optimal regulatory regime and processes, for the optimal design of awarding processes ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Operational Research
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.04.008