Short-Selling Pressure and Workplace Safety: Curbing Short-Termism Through Stakeholder Interdependencies

نویسندگان

چکیده

We advance a multistakeholder framework that highlights the influence of stakeholders in tempering short-termist responses to capital market pressures. When firms face pressure from short sellers market, they sometimes shift attention short-term stock performance and neglect critical investments pay off long run. Relying on quasi-natural experiment establishment-level data workplace injuries, we find short-selling causes an increase employee injuries. Critically, however, degree which response is depends salience multiple (analysts, shareholders, employees, managers). discuss implications for understanding firms’ relations with their and, particularly, how these corporate pressures ways matter long-term value creation. This study also contributes strategy research by highlighting downside deregulation. Funding: Rengong Zhang acknowledges financial support CityU Strategic Research Grant. Supplemental Material: The online appendix available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1576 .

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Organization Science

سال: 2023

ISSN: ['1526-5455', '1047-7039']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1576