Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Manipulation Under Voting Rule Uncertainty1
An important research topic in the field of computational social choice is the complexity of various forms of dishonest behavior, such as manipulation, control, and bribery. While much of the work on this topic assumes that the cheating party has full information about the election, recently there have been a number of attempts to gauge the complexity of non-truthful behavior under uncertainty ...
متن کاملSincerity in Simple and Complex Voting Mechanisms
We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus de ne sincerity as the optimal behavior when conditions to vote strategically diminish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type (simple voting mechanisms) we show that eliminating some conditions for strategic voting, individuals opti...
متن کاملManipulation under voting rule uncertainty
An important research topic in the field of computational social choice is the complexity of various forms of dishonest behavior, such as manipulation, control, and bribery. While much of the work on this topic assumes that the cheating party has full information about the election, recently there have been a number of attempts to gauge the complexity of non-truthful behavior under uncertainty ...
متن کاملApproval Voting and Parochialism
In hypothetical scenarios involving two groups (nations or groups of workers), subjects voted on three proposals: one helped group A (their group), one helped B, and one helped both groups, more than the average of the first two but less than their maximum. When subjects voted for one proposal, most voted for the one that helped group A. This result is “parochial” because it helps the voter’s o...
متن کاملIs Approval Voting Optimal Given Approval Votes?
Some crowdsourcing platforms ask workers to express their opinions by approving a set of k good alternatives. It seems that the only reasonable way to aggregate these k-approval votes is the approval voting rule, which simply counts the number of times each alternative was approved. We challenge this assertion by proposing a probabilistic framework of noisy voting, and asking whether approval v...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0040-5833,1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9301-z