Single-crossing choice correspondences

Reason-based choice correspondences

A reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in terms of a two-stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set S, the individual eliminates from it all of the dominated alternatives according to her …xed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation, in the …rst step. In the second step, …rst she constructs for each maximal alternative identi…ed in the …rst step its l...

Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences

We study the possibilities of constructing strategy-proof rules that choose sets of alternatives as a function of agents' preferences over such sets. We consider two restrictions on the domain of individual preferences over sets. Assuming that all singletons are in the range of the rule, we show that only dictatorial rules can be strategy-proof on the larger domain. The smaller domain also allo...

Choice correspondences for public goods

Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule

This paper studies the strategic foundations of the Representative Voter Theorem (Rothstein, 1991), also called the “second version” of the Median Voter Theorem. As a by-product, it also considers the existence of non-trivial strategy-proof social choice functions over the domain of single-crossing preference profiles. The main result presented here is that single-crossing preferences constitut...

Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences

This paper unifies and extends the recent axiomatic literature on minimax regret. It compares several models of minimax regret, shows how to characterize the according choice correspondences in a unified setting, extends one of them to choice from convex (through randomization) sets, and connects them by defining a behavioral notion of perceived ambiguity. Substantively, a main idea is to behav...