Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Security Game With Hypergame Framework
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide stability criterion help of hyper Nash equilibrium (HNE) investigate both strategic cognitive equilibria in SLMF games misinformation. fact, find mild stable conditions such that deception can become HNE. Moreover, discuss robustness reveal whether players have ability keep their profits under influence some
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1556-6013', '1556-6021']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2022.3155294