Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficiency and income redistribution in the single - peaked preferences model with several commodities * ́
We consider the problem of allocating m infinitely divisible commodities among agents with single-peaked preferences. We propose a variation on the Mas–Colell’s Walrasian solution with slacks to characterize the efficient allocations. Our solution allows us to associate with each efficient allocation an income redistribution. We prove that the original solution proposed by Mas–Colell is the eff...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s355-002-8325-6