Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining*
Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer-specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—...
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We report the first ultimatum game experiment with bargaining over waiting time. The experiment was created to avoid effects of windfall gains. In contrast to donated money, time is not endowed by the experimenter and implies a natural loss to the subjects. This allows for a better measurement of the inherent conflict in the ultimatum game. We implemented three anonymity conditions; one baselin...
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Adaptive learning and a fairness motive we call ‘‘punishment’’ are the basis for two prominent and substantially different types of theories of ultimatum bargaining behavior. We compare adaptive learning and fairness in an experiment that involves punishment and reward versions of the ultimatum game. We draw conclusions concerning the abilities and limitations of both types of theories. The res...
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In typical experiments on ultimatum bargaining, the game is described verbally and the majority of subjects deviate from subgame-perfect behavior. Proposers typically offer significantly more than the minimum possible and responders reject “unfair” offers. In this work, we show that when the ultimatum bargaining game is presented as an abstract game tree, the vast majority of behavior is consis...
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The ultimatum game has been the primary tool for studying bargaining behavior in recent years. However, not enough information is gathered in the ultimatum game to get a clear picture of responders’ utility functions. We analyze a convex ultimatum game in which responders’ can “shrink” an o¤er as well as to accept or reject it. This allows us to observe enough about responders’ preferences to e...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.334100