Social stigma and executive compensation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation for Corporate Social Responsibility
We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test our predictions using novel executive compensation contract data, and find that firms with more shar...
متن کاملexecutive compensation and firm performance: shareholders perspective
this study addresses executive compensation from shareholders perspective by empirically examining the effects of chief executive officer (ceo) compensation on firm performance subsequent to the year of compensation. three factors of ceo compensation are examined, size, total annual compensation; form percentage of total compensation comprised of cash, cash bonuses and stock; and sensitivity. t...
متن کاملPublic Opinion and Executive Compensation
W investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992–2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pa...
متن کاملExecutive Compensation and Investor Clientele
Executive Compensation and Investor Clientele Executive compensation has increased dramatically in recent times, but so has trading volume and individual investor access to financial markets. We provide a model where some managers may understate asset values through misleading statements in order to have enough of a cushion to compensate themselves. Owing to a lack of sophistication or näıveté,...
متن کاملExecutive Compensation and Firm Leverage
This work explores the role of executive compensation in determining the capital structure decisions of a firm. CEOs experience a large personal cost of default that interacts through the risk adjusted probability of default with their compensation contract. Since default happens in a particularly costly state of the world for a CEO whose compensation contract consists primarily of pay for perf...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Banking & Finance
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0378-4266
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.09.003