Solids: A Combinatorial Auction for Real Estate
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Interfaces
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0092-2102,1526-551X
DOI: 10.1287/inte.2014.0749