Solution Concepts in Hierarchical Games Under Bounded Rationality With Applications to Autonomous Driving
نویسندگان
چکیده
With autonomous vehicles (AV) set to integrate further into regular human traffic, there is an increasing consensus of treating AV motion planning as a multi-agent problem. However, the traditional game theoretic assumption complete rationality too strong for purpose driving, and need understanding driving bounded rational activity through behavioral lens. To that end, we adapt three metamodels behavior; two based on Quantal level-k one Nash equilibria with quantal errors. We formalize different solution concepts can be applied in context hierarchical games, framework used planning, creating models behavior. Furthermore, contributed dataset at busy urban intersection total ~4k agents ~44k decision points, evaluate behavior basis model fit naturalistic data, well their predictive capacity. Our results suggest among evaluated, modeling pure strategy errors level maneuvers bounds sampling actions trajectories provides best behavior, significant impact situational factors performance models.
منابع مشابه
Bounded Rationality in Repeated Games∗
Models of bounded rationality often lead to sharper predictions about real world outcomes than their full rationality counterparts. Full rationality in repeated interactions allows a plethora of equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, I examine the effect of bounded rationality in infinitely repeated games. In particular, does the introduction of boundedly rational agents lead to a smaller set of ...
متن کاملPlaying off-line games with bounded rationality
We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we define the complexity of a sequence by its s...
متن کاملRationality and Bounded Information in Repeated Games
Actions in a repeated or stochastic game can in principle depend on all previous outcomes. Given this vast policy space, human players may often be forced to use heuristics that base actions on incomplete information, such as the outcomes of only the most recent trials. Here it is proven that such bounded rationality is often fully rational, in that the optimal policy with respect to some limit...
متن کاملBounded Rationality in Concurrent Parity Games
We consider 2-player games played on a finite state space for an infinite number of rounds. The games are concurrent: in each round, the two players (player 1 and player 2) choose their moves independently and simultaneously; the current state and the two moves determine the successor state. We study concurrent games with ω-regular winning conditions specified as parity objectives. We consider ...
متن کاملDraft: On Concepts of Rationality in Games
Models in the classical theory of games and in neoclassical economics normally assume rationality in the sense that agents have compete and transitive preferences. The paper labels this fundamental rationality and distinguishs two other sorts of rationality pertinent to the study of strategic interaction: individual economic rationality (IER) and effective rationality. IER is, we observe, chara...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the ... AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2159-5399', '2374-3468']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16715