Solving the Inverse Power Problem in Two-Tier Voting Settings
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Solving the Inverse Power Problem in Two-Tier Voting Settings
There are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, where each group is represented by a single person. Theoretical concepts suggest how the voting systems in such committees should be designed, but these abstract rules can usually not be implemented perfectly. To find voting systems that approximate these rules the so called inverse power problem ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2393381