Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A note on the existence of Berge and Berge-Nash equilibria
This paper deals with the problem of existence of Berge and Berge–Nash equilibria. Abalo and Kostreva have proved existence theorems of Berge and Berge–Nash equilibria for S-equi-well-posed and (S, σ)equi-well-posed games, namely, Theorems 3.2–3.3 [Abalo, K.Y., Kostreva, M.M., 1996. Fixed Points, Nash Games and their Organization. Topological Methods in Nonlinear Analysis 8, 205–215.]. In this ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Mathematics Letters
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0893-9659
DOI: 10.1016/s0893-9659(04)90127-9