Spatial evolutionary games with small selection coefficients

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Spatial Evolutionary Games with small selection coefficients

Here we will use results of Cox, Durrett, and Perkins [56] for voter model perturbations to study spatial evolutionary games on Zd, d ≥ 3 when the interaction kernel is finite range, symmetric, and has covariance matrix σ2I. The games we consider have payoff matrices of the form 1 + wG where 1 is matrix of all 1’s and w is small and positive. Since our population size N = ∞, we call our selecti...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Journal of Probability

سال: 2014

ISSN: 1083-6489

DOI: 10.1214/ejp.v19-3621