SpecBox: A Label-Based Transparent Speculation Scheme Against Transient Execution Attacks

Speculative execution techniques have been a cornerstone of modern processors to improve instruction-level parallelism. However, recent studies showed that this kind could be exploited by attackers leak secret data via transient attacks, such as Spectre. Many defenses are proposed address problem, but they all face various challenges: (1) Tracking flow in the instruction pipeline comprehensively it cause stalls and incur high performance overhead; (2) Making side effect speculative imperceptible attackers, often needs additional storage components complicated movement operations. In article, we propose label-based transparent speculation scheme called SpecBox . It dynamically partitions cache system isolate non-speculative data, which can prevent from being observed subsequent execution. Moreover, uses thread ownership semaphores accessed across cores. addition, also enhances auxiliary against hardware prefetcher. Our security analysis shows is secure evaluation overhead on SPEC CPU 2006 PARSEC-3.0 benchmarks small.