Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
Speculative Attacks are a coordination game with multiple equilibria: If a sufficient number of traders expect devaluation, market pressure forces the central bank to abandon a currency peg that it would have kept otherwise. Thus, expectations are self-fulfilling. Applying the global games approach, Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that there is a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies, if...
متن کاملThe Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information By
The theory of global games has shown that coordination games with multiple equilibria may have a unique equilibrium if certain parameters of the payoff function are private information instead of common knowledge. We report the results of an experiment designed to test the predictions of this theory. Comparing sessions with common and private information, we observe only small differences in be...
متن کاملPublic Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games
1 I thank George-Marios Angeletos, Tilman Boergers, Elena Carletti, Vicente Cunat, Martin Hellwig, Thomas Philippon, Hyun Shin and, especially, Stephen Morris for helpful discussions and comments. The remarks of one anonymous referee substantially contributed to and improved the discussion in this paper. I am also grateful for financial support from the Department of Economics at the London Sch...
متن کاملarchitecture and engineering of nanoscale sculptured thin films and determination of their properties
چکیده ندارد.
15 صفحه اولPure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information
We introduce a new game form which allows the players’ strategies to depend on their strategy-relevant private information as well as on some publicly announced information. The players’ payoffs depend on their own payoff-relevant private information and some payoff-relevant common information. Under the assumption that the players’ strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their pri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.302820