Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the fares as a defence doxasticism about delusions (the view they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on grounds typically do not abide by rational standards we expect beliefs conform to. If is Spinozan, argue, these deviations from rationality just compatible with, but supportive of, their status beliefs.
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0279-0750', '1468-0114']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12373