Spreading the Credit: Virtue Reliabilism and Weak Epistemic Anti-Individualism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Anti-luck (too Weak) Virtue Epistemology
Duncan Pritchard (et al. 2010, 2012a, 2012b) has recently shifted his view from an account that primarily understands knowledge in terms of the safety principle (a view mainly developed in his 2005 monograph on epistemic luck) to an ‘impure’ variety of virtue epistemology, which combines the safety principle with a weakened virtue-theoretic condition, a view that he calls anti-luck virtue epist...
متن کاملEpistemic Virtue from the Viewpoints of Mulla Sadra and Zagzebski
This paper compares epistemic virtue from the viewpoints of Zagzebski and Mulla Sadra, aiming to determine the extent to which their viewpoints on epistemic virtue are similar. Zagzebski, the contemporary philosopher, considers epistemic virtue as the basis on which knowledge is interpreted. She sees epistemic virtue as a requirement for achieving knowledge. Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcen...
متن کاملepistemic virtue from the viewpoints of mulla sadra and zagzebski
this paper compares epistemic virtue from the viewpoints of zagzebski and mulla sadra, aiming to determine the extent to which their viewpoints on epistemic virtue are similar. zagzebski, the contemporary philosopher, considers epistemic virtue as the basis on which knowledge is interpreted. she sees epistemic virtue as a requirement for achieving knowledge. mulla sadra, the founder of transcen...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Erkenntnis
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0165-0106,1572-8420
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-015-9741-2