Stability of equilibrium price-production of dynamic duopoly Bertrand–Cournot game in a transnational supply chain with asymmetric information

Abstract Bounded rationality, asymmetric information and foreign trade are widespread in the economic market, have been studied extensively oligopoly games, but there not many works discussing bounded rationality supply chain hybrid game. In contrast with existing works, our study, we innovatively construct a duopoly Bertrand–Cournot game model transnational information. It is assumed that upstream firm 1 knows all market adopts boundedly rational expectation, while downstream 2 only partially uses naïve expectation. Based on theory nonlinear dynamic theory, complexity of discrete system analysed respect to effective information, shareholding ratio price sensitivity. Results reveal following: (i) When little about firm, may be unstable or even chaotic; otherwise, it conducive stability product market. (ii) sensitivity relatively small, more stable, as they increase, price-production goes through bifurcation eventually falls into chaos. Our research has an important theoretical practical significance for competition markets.