Stable equilibria under optimizing selection.
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Regions of stable equilibria for models of differential selection in the two sexes under random mating.
The equilibrium structure of models of differential selection in the sexes is investigated. It is shown that opposing additive selection leads to stable polymorphic equilibria for only a restricted set of selection intensities, and that for weak selection intensities must be of approximately the same magnitude in the sexes. General models of opposing directional selection, with arbitrary domina...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
سال: 1966
ISSN: 0027-8424,1091-6490
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.56.4.1345