Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Proposal : Electing Committees Stephen C
Extensive work has been done to expose and analyze the flaws in common single-candidate election procedures. Arrow’s Theorem states that there exists no perfect voting procedure, so the existing research serves to compare and analyze existing voting systems as well as propose new systems. The problem of electing committees is clearly more complex; less research has been done to investigate the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Group Decision and Negotiation
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0926-2644,1572-9907
DOI: 10.1007/s10726-016-9504-8