Stable Voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Voting is that if candidate A would win without another B in the election, and beats head-to-head majority comparison, then should still election with included (unless there $$A'$$ A ′ who has same kind claim to winning, which case tiebreaker may choose between such candidates). call this Stability for Winners (with Tiebreaking). satisfies while also having remarkable ability avoid tied outcomes elections even small numbers voters.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Constitutional Political Economy
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1043-4062', '1572-9966']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09383-9