Stackelberg Game Analysis of E-Waste Recycling Stakeholders under Recovery Time Sensitivity and CRMs Life Expectancy Sensitivity

In order to discuss the participation selection strategy of relevant subjects in WEEE recycling, a Stackelberg game model “recyclers—remanufacturers—government” recycling network is constructed, and system’s stability conditions are analyzed. Besides this, direct indirect effects recovery time sensitivity, CRMs’ life expectancy government subsidies on optimal decision-making both recyclers remanufacturers explored. The results show that system can achieve stable ideal equilibrium, win–win for all parties, through reasonable profit transfer cost-sharing. dual sensitivity manufacturers’ demand policy has same qualitative impact decision variables remanufacturers. vary depending effort level remanufacturers, these incentivize increase expectancy. Moreover, cost-sharing contract between avoid “free-riding” behavior recycling. research assist benefit coordination adjustment members, provide theoretical basis governments formulate appropriate promote formal E-waste.