Stackelberg Game Based Dynamic Admission and Scheduling in Mobile Crowdsensing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Data-Centric Mobile Crowdsensing
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a promising sensing paradigm that leverages the diverse embedded sensors in massive mobile devices. A key objective in MCS is to efficiently schedule mobile users to perform multiple sensing tasks. Prior work mainly focused on interactions between the task-layer and the user-layer, without considering tasks’ similar data requirements and users’ heterogeneous sensing...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Access
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2169-3536
DOI: 10.1109/access.2019.2929774