Stackelberg strategies for wastewater management
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Stackelberg Mixed Strategies
It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and ind...
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, Abstract. This paper is concerned with the derivation of open-loop 8tackelberg (OL8) solutions of a class of continuoustime two-player nonzero-sum differential games characterized by quadratic cost functionals and linear singular systems. By applying the calculus of variations, necessary conditions are derived under which the op~n-Ioop 8tackelberg solution of the leader exists. Under the tran...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0377-0427
DOI: 10.1016/j.cam.2014.11.061