Stakeholders’ perceptions and reputational antecedents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Foreign Direct Investment in Russia: Stakeholders’ Views and Perceptions
Volumes of foreign direct investments (FDI) are growing steadily, however, transition economies, such as Russia, are attracting only a minor share of FDI despite of available potentials. Risk aversion is one of the reasons influencing decision-making processes of FDI investors. This paper reviews existing objective and subjective risks, which impact decisions regarding FDI. The results of the p...
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متن کاملReputational bargaining and deadlines
How will agents behave when bargaining in the face of an upcoming deadline? If irrational types exist, committed to their bargaining positions, rational agents will imitate this tough behavior to gain reputational benefits, even though this may result in the deadline being missed. Notably, if agents are patient and irrational types are committed to fixed demands then agreement must necessarily ...
متن کاملReputational bargaining and deadlines
I introduce irrational types, who are committed to their demands, into a bargaining model with an uncertain deadline for agreement. Rational agents imitate these demands, hoping to benefit from a “tough” reputation. When irrational types are committed to fixed demands and agents are patient, this provides an explanation for “deadline effects” in bargaining: agreement is “U-shaped”, occurring ei...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Advances in Management Research
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0972-7981
DOI: 10.1108/jamr-08-2014-0050