State Institutions and Tax Capacity

State Capacity, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition

Abstract The theory of international tax competition suggests that governments attempt to attract mobile capital bases by undercutting the foreign capital tax rate. An analysis of the role that state capacity plays in tax policymaking under international pressures is, however, missing. The central contribution of our study is to highlight the importance of the interaction between state capaci...

state capacity, capital mobility, and tax competition

abstract the theory of international tax competition suggests that governments attempt to attract mobile capital bases by undercutting the foreign capital tax rate. an analysis of the role that state capacity plays in tax policymaking under international pressures is, however, missing. the central contribution of our study is to highlight the importance of the interaction between state capacity...

Tax Morale and Institutions

This paper analyses the impact of direct democracy, trust in government, the court and the legal system, and federalism on tax morale. In the tax compliance literature it is novel to analyse tax morale as dependent variable and to systematically analyse the effects of formal and informal institutions in Switzerland, a country where participation rights and the degree of federalism vary across d...

State and private institutions

Tax farming and the origins of state capacity in England and France

How did modern and centralized fiscal institutions emerge? We develop a model that explains (i) why pre-industrial states relied on private individuals to collect taxes; (ii) why after 1600 both England and France moved from competitive methods for collecting revenues to allocating the right to collect taxes to a small group of financiers—an intermediate institution that we call cabal tax farmi...