State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Central European Journal of Operations Research
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1435-246X,1613-9178
DOI: 10.1007/s10100-016-0461-8