Stochastic games with hidden states
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stochastic Games with Hidden States∗
This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe payoffs and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. Public randomization is available. We find that, very generally, the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state in the limit as the discount factor goes to one. We also provide a recursive charac...
متن کاملStochastic Games with 2 Non-Absorbing States
In the present paper we consider recursive games that satisfy an absorbing property defined by Vieille. We give two sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium payoff in such games, and prove that if the game has at most two non-absorbing states, then at least one of the conditions is satisfied. Using a reduction of Vieille, we conclude that every stochastic game which has at most two...
متن کاملHidden Stochastic Games and Limit Equilibrium Payoffs
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges, and provide a simple example where the set of equilibrium payoffs has no limit. We then introdu...
متن کاملMean Field Stochastic Games with Discrete States and Mixed Players
We consider mean field Markov decision processes with a major player and a large number of minor players which have their individual objectives. The players have decoupled state transition laws and are coupled by the costs via the state distribution of the minor players. We introduce a stochastic difference equation to model the update of the limiting state distribution process and solve limiti...
متن کاملStochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints
This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous reward which depends on its state and the population’s profile, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te3068