Stochastic limit-average games are in EXPTIME
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stochastic Limit-Average Games are in EXPTIME
The value of a finite-state two-player zero-sum stochastic game with limit-average payoff can be approximated to within ε in time exponential in a polynomial in the size of the game times polynomial in logarithmic in 1 ε , for all ε > 0.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0110-5