منابع مشابه
Stock Option Grants to Target CEOs during Merger Negotiations
Many target CEOs receive unscheduled stock option awards during merger negotiations which become immediately exercisable when the acquisition is completed. We find an inverse association between the size of golden parachutes given to target CEOs and the probability that these executives receive unscheduled options during merger negotiations. These unscheduled awards are also more likely to be i...
متن کاملIncentives from stock option grants: a behavioral approach
Purpose –This paper analyzes the valuation of stock options from the perspective of an employee exhibiting preferences as described by Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT). In addition, it elaborates on their incentives effect and some implications in terms of design aspects. Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on the CPT framework to derive a continuous time model of the stock option sub...
متن کاملEmployee Stock Options, Equity Valuation, and the Valuation of Option Grants Using a Warrant-Pricing Model
We investigate the use of a warrant-pricing approach to incorporate employee stock options (ESOs) into equity valuation and to account for the dilutive effect of ESOs in the valuation of option grants for financial reporting purposes. Our valuation approach accounts for the jointly determined nature of ESO and shareholder values. The empirical results show that our stock price estimate exhibits...
متن کاملWhat Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?
W estimate that 13.6% of all option grants to top executives during the period 1996–2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated. Our study primarily focuses on grants that were unscheduled and at-themoney, of which we estimate that 18.9% were manipulated. The fraction is 23.0% before the new two-day filing requirement took effect on August 29, 2002, and 10.0% afterward. For the minority of gra...
متن کاملHigh powered Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior: Stock based versus Stock Option based Compensation
In this paper shareholders face the trade-off between providing managers with incentives to exert beneficial effort and to engage in costly fraudulent activity. We solve for the optimal compensation package, given that shareholders can either grant (restricted) stock or stock options and given fixed average compensation costs. We show that if the negative effect of fraud on the company’s value ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2157-8834,0892-7626
DOI: 10.19030/jabr.v34i2.10125