Strategic Communication: Prices Versus Quantities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: prices versus quantities
Environmental regulators often have imperfect information about regulated firms’ abatement costs. In this paper we compare taxes and emissions permits in a dynamic setting in which firms behave strategically. The regulator updates policy over time based upon previous aggregate industry performance, assuming that firms are not strategic. We find that strategic firms facing an emissions tax have ...
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The setting for the problem under consideration is a large economic organization or system which in some cases is best thought of as the entire economy. Within this large economic organization resources are allocated by some combination of commands and prices (the exact mixture is inessential) or even by some other unspecified mechanism. The following question arises. For one particular isolate...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1542-4766,1542-4774
DOI: 10.1162/jeea.2010.8.2-3.365