STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Delegation in a Stackelberg Game with Multiple Stages
We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrary number, n, of firms. We show that n − 1 firms delegate their production decisions and only one firm (the one whose manager is the first mover) does not. The later a manager commits to a quantity, the higher his incentive rate. Letting ui denote the equilibrium payoff of the firm whose manager commits in the i-th stage, we ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198911003039