Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider problem is so severe that the equilibrium number of experiments is at most one plus the number of ex...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.017