Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule. Howev...
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It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situations, when information about voters' preferences is complete, the voters' preferences on alternatives induce voters' preferences over the set of available voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of ch...
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We present a geometric model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority enjoys a vast power of determining the social outcome, as locally or globally stable social op...
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In voting theory the well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is about the manipulability of aggregators which consists of the aggregation of individual preferences expressed as a complete ordering over the set of alternatives. This paper deals with the generalization of such a theorem in a context where each individual expresses a fuzzy preference (weak) ordering. This extension is called H-ma...
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This paper presents some generalizations of the Gibbard -Satterthwaite result (1973, 1975) for fuzzy preference relations. It explores the implication of weakening the transitivity condition of the Ben Abdealziz et al.’s (2008) fuzzy manipulability concept. For this purpose, the max-min transitivity is replaced by weaker transitivity: the max-?-transitivity, where ? is a t-norm. In addition, th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Operations Research
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0254-5330,1572-9338
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1763-7