Strategic price discounting and rationing in uniform price auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply
In the uniform-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1 N3 below the Walrasian price. By contrast, given the usual market-clearing rule it is well-known that the uniform-price auction can lead ...
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The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Summary We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects i...
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We analyze a broad class of auctions in which goods are traded at a single price, such as the uniform price auctions and the double auction (Satterthwaite and Williams (1989)), while admitting the presence of both common and private value and allowing players to trade more than one unit of the object. Instead of calculating a Nash equilibrium, we first eliminate the weakly dominated strategies,...
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Recently both the range and the value of objects sold by auction have grown tremendously. An auction is an exchange mechanism with asymmetric information. Auctions are so popular because when the seller is unsure about the value that bidders assign to the sold objects, one possible way to reveal the bidder who is willing to pay the highest price for the object is to apply an appropriate auction...
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This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm’s minimum acceptable price and the maximum qu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.008