Strategic self-ignorance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ignorance, Uncertainty, and Strategic Consumption-Portfolio Decisions
This paper constructs a recursive utility version of a canonical Merton (1971) model with uninsurable labor income and unknown income growth to study how the interaction between two types of uncertainty due to ignorance affects strategic consumption-portfolio rules and precautionary savings. Specifically, after solving the model explicitly, we theoretically and quantitatively explore (i) how th...
متن کاملVolunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can find out about this cost ahead of the volunteering game, a strategic value is attached to the informa...
متن کاملStrategic Ignorance in the Second-Price Auction
Suppose bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second-price auction with costly bidding. All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when bidders are sufficiently few. Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price. JEL Codes: D44.
متن کاملStrategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences
P in dictator games frequently avoid learning whether their choice to maximize their own earnings will help or hurt the recipient and then choose selfishly, exploiting the “moral wiggle room” provided by their ignorance. However, this is found in an environment in which the dictator must actively learn the true payoffs, so inaction means ignorance. Does this effect persist when one must activel...
متن کاملSelf-attenuating Strategic Voting
This is an analysis of strategic voting under qualified majority voting. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict complete coordination of strategic voting: a strict interpretation of Duverger’s Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public and private signals of popular ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0895-5646,1573-0476
DOI: 10.1007/s11166-016-9236-9