Strategic trade in pollution permits
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Holistic View of Trade, Pollution Permits and Abatement A Holistic View of Trade, Pollution Permits and Abatement
By constructing a dynamic general equilibrium model this paper studies the optimal pollution emission and abatement policies for a small economy. We show that in autarky government issues an optimal level of emission permits but its optimal abatement level is zero at the unique steadystate equilibrium. On the other hand, government employs an optimal two-dimensional policy with free trade if th...
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This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can both invest in low– emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance prices are generated endogenously and are inter–dependent. It is shown that the non–cooperative...
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We analyze the effects of free trade on environmental policies in a strategic setting with transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental outcomes, making both countries worse off. With command and control policies (quotas), there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable permits, unless pollution is a pure global public ...
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This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low– emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated endogenously and are inter–dependent. It is shown that the non–cooperative ...
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This paper analyzes polluters’ incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0095-0696
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.009